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Abstract 
This study examined future-oriented behaviour in children (3-6 years; N = 193) from three 
diverse societies – one industrialised Western city (Brisbane, Australia) and two small, 
geographically isolated communities (Indigenous Australians and South African Bushmen).  
Children had the opportunity to prepare for two alternative versions of an immediate future 
event.  Some 3-year-olds from all cultures performed well, and a majority of the oldest 
children from each culture prepared for both possibilities on all six trials.  Although there 
were some cultural differences in the youngest age groups that approached ceiling 
performance, the overall results indicate that children across these communities become able 
to prepare for alternative futures during early childhood. This acquisition period is therefore 
not contingent on Western upbringing and may instead indicate normal cognitive maturation.
2 
 
The capacity to imagine and prepare for specific future events, or episodic foresight, 
has often been placed at the centre of humans’ ascendancy over the planet (e.g., Ambrose, 
2010; Buckner & Carroll, 2007; Schacter et al., 2007; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007).  Being 
able to reflect on various upcoming possibilities and actively shape the future to their own 
desire may have enabled our ancestors to survive and thrive in a wide range of hostile and 
uncertain environments (Suddendorf, 2013), and this faculty continues to provide substantial 
benefits in modern life.  Developmental psychologists have shown an increasing interest in 
foresight in recent years, with an abundance of studies documenting the ontogeny of 
children’s future-oriented language skills and behavioural capacities (for reviews, see Atance, 
2015; Hudson, Mayhew, & Prabhakar, 2011; McCormack & Atance, 2011; Suddendorf, 
2017; Suddendorf & Redshaw, 2013).  Studies have principally focused on young children, 
with major performance shifts often occurring between 3 and 5 years.  This overall pattern of 
results could be taken to indicate that typically developing children acquire a basic capacity 
for foresight during these years as a part of normal human cognitive maturation.   
One glaring oversight in this field, however, is that the vast majority of studies have 
focused on children growing up in so-called WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialised, 
Rich, and Democratic) societies (cf. Henrich et al., 2010).  And while a handful of studies 
have examined non-WEIRD children (e.g., Naito & Suzuki, 2011; Wang, Capous, Koh, & 
Hou, 2014), no published studies so far have directly compared children from WEIRD and 
non-WEIRD cultural groups on the same future-oriented behavioural task.  In many domains, 
children from WEIRD societies represent a very limited slice of humanity as a whole, as their 
developing brains are exposed to various cultural phenomena that are acutely novel on the 
scale of human history and yet still unshared with many contemporary societies (see Nielsen 
& Haun, 2016; Nielsen, Haun, Kärtner, & Legare, 2017).  Such phenomena may profoundly 
influence how these children represent and behave in the world, and thus it may be 
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inappropriate to use their performances on future-oriented tasks alone to make claims about 
the universal development of foresight.  Elaborate child-directed parental narratives about 
future events, for example, are pervasive in WEIRD cultures (Hudson, 2001; 2002; 2006), 
and might be expected to greatly accelerate the development of future-oriented behaviour in 
these children (see Fivush, Haden, & Reece, 2006, for a review of similar effects on memory 
development).  Early exposure to Westernised preschooling might also be expected to 
influence children’s foresight along with more general cognitive changes (cf. Duncan, 2003; 
Peisner-Feinberg et al., 2001). 
On the other hand, given the central importance of foresight to human success across 
the planet, there are reasons to expect broadly similar developments in children’s future-
oriented cognition and behavioural capacities across both WEIRD and non-WEIRD cultural 
groups.  Indeed, like other critical human traits, such as language (Kuhl, 2004) and imitation 
(Nielsen & Tomaselli, 2010), one might predict there to be a relatively fixed maturation 
period during which these capacities are acquired by children irrespective of their cultural 
environment.  This is not to necessarily say there would be no cultural influences at play, as 
children may require at least some exposure to future-oriented language and concepts in order 
for this normal period of emergence to manifest.  Given that future tense and/or other future-
oriented markers appear to be universal across languages (Bittner, 2005; Comrie, 1985; 
Malotki, 1983), however, one might not expect much variation between children from 
WEIRD and non-WEIRD cultures on this basis alone. 
One fundamental component of foresight that has received attention in the 
developmental literature is the capacity to imagine and prepare for multiple, even mutually 
exclusive future possibilities.  Given that the future is often uncertain, it can be prudent to 
‘hedge one’s bets’ to ensure that one will end up acquiring benefits no matter how an 
undetermined event transpires. Beck, Robinson, Carroll, and Apperly (2006) were the first to 
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investigate the development of this basic capacity, utilising a paradigm where a toy mouse 
could fall down one of two slides in an unpredictable fashion. When children (from a WEIRD 
society) were asked to place cotton wool at the bottom of the slides to protect the mouse, few 
4-year-olds and just over half of 5-year-olds placed wool at the bottom of both slides, thus 
ensuring the safety of the mouse. Robinson, Rowley, Beck, Carroll, and Apperly (2006) 
found a similar pattern of results in a conceptually similar but structurally distinct task, where 
children (from the same WEIRD society) had to place containers at the bottom of two chutes 
to ensure they would catch a falling block. 
Inspired by these early paradigms, Redshaw and Suddendorf (2016) developed a 
minimalist, largely non-verbal task that could be used with even very young children (and 
non-human primates). In their ‘forked tube’ paradigm, the experimenter dropped a desirable 
item into an inverted Y-shaped tube with two possible exits, with a hidden internal 
mechanism forcing the item to exit from either side in a pseudorandom order. Two- to 4-year-
old children from Brisbane, Australia (a WEIRD group), were initially shown six 
demonstration trials, before being given the opportunity to catch the item over several trials. 
Although 2-year-olds (and non-human great apes) typically covered only one exit when 
preparing to catch the item, some 3-year-olds and most 4-year-olds spontaneously and 
consistently covered both exits from the first trial onwards. These results indicate that 
children from at least one WEIRD society generally acquire the basic capacity to prepare for 
mutually exclusive future possibilities around 3 to 4 years of age, much earlier than the older 
studies suggested (also see Beck, 2017; Suddendorf, Crimston, & Redshaw, 2017). What 
remains unclear, however, is whether this acquisition period generalises beyond WEIRD 
societies, or if it is an expression of peculiar cultural traits. The forked tube task may be 
particularly valuable for answering this question, as its minimalist and largely non-verbal 
design means that differences in children’s performance are unlikely to be related to cultural 
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variations in understanding the structure and contingencies of the task itself.  Moreover, the 
use of several trials allows one to distinguish between response patterns suggestive of insight, 
such as where a child passes consistently after initially covering two exits, or incomplete 
comprehension, such as where a child regresses to covering only one exit after first covering 
two (see Redshaw & Suddendorf, 2016). 
The current study 
In the current study, we administered the forked tube task to 3- to 6-year-old children 
from three diverse cultural groups in local settings.  Of these three groups, one was a WEIRD 
society (Brisbane, Australia; a partial replication and extension of the original study), 
whereas the other two were geographically isolated communities that have connections with 
but are not directly influenced by Western culture (Indigenous Australians and South African 
Bushmen1; see Supplementary Material for more details).  Although studies on parent-child 
talk about the future in these two groups are unfortunately lacking, all of their everyday 
languages use auxiliary verbs (e.g., equivalent to will, shall, or am going to in English) or 
other grammatical particles to indicate future reference (Angelo & Schultze-Berndt, 2016; 
Vossen, 2012).  If the Brisbane children were to perform significantly and substantially better 
than the other groups across ages, then this might suggest that the emergence of the capacity 
to prepare for alternative futures is subject to WEIRD cultural influences.  If, on the other 
hand, competence were to emerge in early childhood across all three cultures, then this would 
suggest that Redshaw and Suddendorf’s (2016) findings generalise beyond WEIRD societies 
and may even indicate a relatively fixed acquisition period that manifests as a part of normal 
cognitive maturation.   
 
                                                            
1 There has been much debate over naming and self-naming amongst this group.  San is the official term, a 
Nama word meaning ‘forager’ or ‘bandit’.  Our research communities, however, prefer the name ‘Bushmen’, 
which entails a positive reappropriation of a term previously considered pejorative.  We therefore use our 
communities’ own self-naming, which encodes a degree of resistance to being named by officialism. 
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Method 
Participants 
As is customary in cross-cultural research, all children in the rural communities who 
wanted to participate were tested.  This resulted in uneven participant numbers (96 Bushmen 
and 33 Indigenous Australians), and so we decided to collect an intermediate number of 
participants in Brisbane (64).  Across groups, children’s ages were recorded as a single whole 
number between three and six years, as we did not have access to the Bushman children’s 
dates of birth and we did not wish to bias the analyses by only entering precise ages for the 
other two groups.  Few Indigenous Australian 6-year-olds were available to participate, and 
so we decided to restrict this sample to children aged three to five.  Participant demographics 
are summarised in Table 1, and detailed descriptions of each culture are produced in the 
Supplementary Material.  Data were collected between September 2014 and December 2016. 
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
 Children participated one at a time in local settings.  All Brisbane children were tested 
in a secluded area of a local science museum that they were attending with a parent or 
guardian either on the weekend or during school holidays.  Indigenous Australian children 
were tested either inside or just outside of day care crèches (mostly 3-year-olds), preschool 
classrooms (mostly 4- and 5-year-olds), or public school classrooms (some 5-year-olds) on 
days they were attending these facilities.  Bushman children were tested either inside or just 
outside of day care crèches (all 3- to 5-year-olds) or public school classrooms (all 6-year-
olds).  Structured learning from qualified educational practitioners is customary in Australian 
preschools and schools such as those in Brisbane and the Indigenous communities, which 
children typically enrol in from around age 4 (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2017). Formal, 
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Westernised education is also available in the public schools attended by the 6-year-old 
Bushman participants. Attendance levels at these schools are variable, although we sampled 
the children on a normal school day and no students arrived specifically to be tested. The day 
care crèches where we tested the younger Bushman children, however, have limited 
educational and staffing resources available, with formal lessons uncommon. Attendance 
levels are typically low, and many children arrived late in the day specifically to be tested 
(see Supplementary Material for extra information; and for more details on these 
communities and their schooling practices, see Nielsen, Mushin, Tomaselli, & Whiten, 2014). 
Materials 
 The forked tube apparatus was the same as that used in the original study (Redshaw & 
Suddendorf, 2016).  The experimenter could drop a ball into a single opening at the top of the 
tube and surreptitiously control which of two bottom exits it would fall from.  Children could 
ensure they would catch the ball by simply covering both exits with one hand each.  The 
‘single tube’, which was used only in the practice phase, consisted of a simple straight pipe 
with one opening at the top and one exit at the bottom.  Children placed caught balls into a 
small bucket beside them, whereas missed balls fell into a large container where children 
were not permitted to retrieve them (see Supplementary Material for further information on 
testing materials; and see Figure 1 for a representative depiction of the testing setting across 
each of the three groups).   
 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
 
Procedure 
 Testing Procedure.  The experimenter asked children to place their hands behind 
their back and watch (and also demonstrated this), before dropping three balls consecutively 
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into the single tube, with the balls falling into the large container in front of the children.  The 
experimenter then told the children that they could try to catch the balls, before 
demonstrating how to do so by placing a hand directly over the single tube exit.  Children 
were told they were to place any caught balls into the small bucket beside them, and the 
experimenter again dropped balls into the single tube until the child had caught three 
consecutively (nearly always on the first three attempts). 
 The experimenter then introduced the children to the forked tube, before again asking 
the children to place their hands behind their back and watch.  The experimenter dropped six 
balls into the tube, with the balls exiting in the following pseudorandom order: right, left, left, 
right, left, right (from the experimenter’s perspective).  Again, the experimenter told the 
children that they could try to catch the balls and place them into the bucket, and that this 
time if they caught lots of balls they would be rewarded with stickers.  The experimenter told 
the children that they could do whatever they wanted when trying to catch the balls, without 
mentioning the opportunity to cover both exits.  The experimenter then began the six test 
trials, with the balls exiting the tube in the following pseudorandom order: right, left, left, 
right, left, right (from the experimenter’s perspective).  If the experimenter mistakenly 
deviated from this sequence, subsequent trials were adjusted to retain the overall distribution 
of the ball emerging from each exit 50% of the time.  Some children received six further 
trials, but others did not because of time constraints on testing.  We therefore analysed 
children’s performance on only the first six trials in order to make statistical comparisons 
more interpretable.  All children were rewarded with stickers at the end of the experiment.   
 Delivery of Verbal Instructions.  Verbal instructions to the Brisbane children were 
delivered in English by the experimenter (first author).  Instructions to the Indigenous 
Australian children were delivered by one of two experimenters (third or fourth author).  
Although many of the Indigenous Australian children speak a local vernacular termed ‘Kriol’ 
9 
 
in everyday life (Mushin, 2010), they are instructed in English at their crèches, preschools, 
and schools, and are able to comprehend English.  In line with previous research (e.g., 
Neldner, Mushin, & Nielsen, 2017; Nielsen et al., 2014), therefore, instructions were also 
delivered to these children in English.  Instructions to the Bushman children were initially 
delivered in English by the experimenter (first author) and subsequently translated for these 
non-English speaking participants by a local community member. 
Coding 
 Children were considered to pass a trial if they were at least partially covering two 
exits (with one hand each) as the ball fell.  Children did not necessarily have to catch the ball 
to pass, as rarely a ball would bounce off their hand and fall away even when they were 
covering both exits.  Children who covered a single exit (or, very rarely, no exits) were 
considered to fail that trial.  Additionally, following Redshaw and Suddendorf (2016), 
children were classified into one of four categories based on their response patterns across the 
six trials: (1) those who covered two exits on the first trial and all subsequent trials, (2) those 
who failed to cover two exits on the first trial, but did cover two exits at some stage and 
maintained that response across all subsequent trials, (3) those who covered two exits on at 
least one trial (first or otherwise) but regressed to covering only one exit on at least one 
subsequent trial, and (4) those who failed to cover two exits on any trial.  Performance was 
video recorded and later scored by the experimenter who tested the children, and 25% of the 
data from each sample were also scored by a second coder.  Reliability was excellent, with 
97.9% agreement between coders (282 out of 288 double-coded trials). 
Results 
First Trial Performance 
 Children’s responses on the first trial were examined with a series of binomial 
Generalised Estimating Equations analyses nested within the full factorial model of Culture 
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(Brisbane vs Indigenous Australian vs Bushman) x Age (linear variable ranging from 3 to 6 
years) x Sex (male vs female).  See the Supplementary Materials for comprehensive details of 
model selection procedures. 
The best performing model contained significant main effects of Age, χ2(1) = 22.55, p 
< .001, and Culture, χ2(2) = 11.84, p = .003, but no effect of Sex and no interactions.  Older 
children were more likely to cover two exits on the first trial than younger children, b = .70, 
se = .16.  Following up the Culture effect (and applying a Bonferroni adjustment for three 
comparisons) revealed that, across ages, Brisbane children were significantly more likely to 
cover two exits on the first trial than Bushman children, χ2(1) = 10.26, b = 1.86, se = .37, 
adjusted p = .004.  There were no significant differences in performance, however, between 
the Brisbane and Indigenous Australian children, χ2(1) = 0.51, b = .33, se = .47, adjusted p > 
.999, or between the Indigenous Australian and Bushman children, χ2(1) = 3.86, b = .85, se = 
.44, adjusted p = .148.   
 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
 
Trial-by-trial Performance 
Children’s responses across all six trials (see Figure 2) were examined with a series of 
binomial Generalised Estimating Equations analyses nested within the full factorial model of 
Culture (Brisbane vs Indigenous Australian vs Bushman) x Age (linear variable ranging from 
3 to 6 years) x Sex (male vs female) x Trial (linear variable ranging from 1 to 6).  See the 
Supplementary Materials for comprehensive details of model selection procedures. 
The best performing model contained significant main effects of Age, χ2(1) = 27.64, p 
< .001, Trial, χ2(1) = 22.51, p < .001, and Culture, χ2(2) = 14.79, p = .001, but no effect of 
Sex and no interactions.  Older children were more likely to cover two exits on any given trial 
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than younger children, b = .74, se = .13, and children across ages were more likely to cover 
two exits on later trials than earlier trials, b = .17, se = .03.  Following up the Culture effect 
(and applying a Bonferroni adjustment for three comparisons) revealed that, across ages, 
Brisbane children were significantly more likely to cover two exits on any given trial than 
Bushman children, χ2(1) = 13.62, b = 1.17, se = .32, adjusted p = .001.  Again, there were no 
significant differences in performance between the Brisbane and Indigenous Australian 
children, χ2(1) = 0.89, b = .38, se = .40, adjusted p > .999, or between the Indigenous 
Australian and Bushman children, χ2(1) = 4.47, b = .79, se = .38, adjusted p = .103.  
Comprehensive summaries of the proportion of trials passed as a function of age and culture 
are reproduced in the Supplementary Material (see Table S5). 
 Post-hoc comparison of Brisbane and Bushman children across age groups.  
Although the best performing model did not contain a Culture x Age interaction, the 
descriptive statistics from the Brisbane and Bushman children suggest a more complicated 
story.  As is evident in Figure 2, there appeared to be little cross-cultural variation between 
the 3-year-olds (who performed at a moderate level) and the 6-year-olds (who performed 
close to ceiling) from these groups.  Thus, the Culture main effect appeared to be driven 
largely by cross-cultural differences between the 4- and 5-year-olds.  In order to 
systematically explore the nuances of this unexpected pattern of variation, we first checked 
for curvilinear age-based differences between the Brisbane and Bushman children.  We did 
this by creating a dummy variable where 3- and 6-year-olds were coded as 0 and 4- and 5-
year-olds were coded as 1, such that 4- and 5-year-olds represented the top of the curvilinear 
function. The best fitting GEE model contained a significant interaction between this dummy 
variable and Culture, χ2(1) = 6.85, p = .009, indicating that the performance differences 
between these cultures were indeed curvilinear with age and greater among 4- and 5-year-
olds than among 3- and 6-year-olds. We then conducted four series of post-hoc GEE analyses 
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checking for statistical differences between the Brisbane and Bushman children across each 
of the age groups tested.  The four best performing models suggested that there were indeed 
performance differences between the 4- and 5-year-olds from these two cultures, but not the 
3- and 6-year-olds (see Table 2 for summary).  
 
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
Response Patterns across Trials 
 Children’s categorised response patterns across all six trials are summarised in Figure 
3.  Inspecting this figure shows that, across all three cultures there were some 3-year-olds 
who either covered two exits on every trial (see blue bars) or failed the first trial but 
spontaneously covered two exits at some stage and sustained that response thereafter (see 
green bars).  The majority of 3-year-olds from all three groups passed at least one trial (see all 
non-red bars).  Across cultures, at least half of the 4- and 5-year-olds showed one of the two 
most optimal response patterns (see blue and green bars), and very few children older than 4 
regressed to covering only one exit after initially passing (see yellow bars).  The majority of 
Brisbane children passed all trials from 4 years onwards (replicating Redshaw & Suddendorf, 
2016), whereas this performance level was not achieved until 5 years in the Indigenous 
Australian children and 6 years in the Bushman children (see blue bars). 
 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
 
Discussion 
 The current study provided the first cross-cultural investigation of children’s 
performance on a future-oriented behavioural task.  In a sample of 3- to 6-year-old children 
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from one WEIRD society and two non-WEIRD societies, we found that at least half of the 3-
year-olds in each group spontaneously prepared for two mutually exclusive versions of an 
immediate future event on at least one trial. Whereas some of these younger children 
regressed to covering only one exit after passing, other 3-year-olds from each culture passed 
consistently, which indicates they possessed insight into the contingencies of the task.  This 
level of performance was superior to the floor performance evinced by 2-year-old WEIRD 
children in the original study (Redshaw & Suddendorf, 2016), suggesting that initial signs of 
the capacity may appear in all three groups at similar ages.  Although there was some cultural 
variation in the youngest ages that participants approached ceiling performance, our results 
suggest that children across all three societies typically become able to imagine and prepare 
for alternative future possibilities during the first six years of life.  The acquisition of this 
capacity in early childhood, therefore, is not specific to WEIRD cultural upbringing, and may 
even indicate normal cognitive maturation. 
 Although the consistent age-related improvement seen across all three cultures is 
likely related to developments in the capacity to consider alternative futures, it may also be 
partly explained by more general early childhood developments in inhibitory control and task 
shifting (see Garon, Bryson, & Smith, 2008, for a review). Indeed, one critical requirement of 
passing the forked tube task is to inhibit the prepotent response of covering only one exit 
(learned during the practice phase) and instead switch to covering two exits (Redshaw & 
Suddendorf, 2016). Children’s significant improvement across the six test trials could be 
attributed in part to overcoming these demands with increasing experience of the task. 
Nevertheless, the fact that this trial effect did not interact with the culture effect suggests that 
inhibitory demands, even if applicable, were not differentially related to performance in 
WEIRD and non-WEIRD children. We did not include measures of inhibitory control and 
task switching in this initial study, as we wanted to keep linguistic and other superfluous task 
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demands to a minimum for the benefit of both the non-WEIRD children and their translators.  
Future cross-cultural research, however, may wish to include such measures, given the 
central role of executive factors in overcoming a tendency to focus on the present and instead 
acting for the future (Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007). 
 The Brisbane children performed significantly better overall than the Bushman 
children, but closer inspection of the data showed that this effect applied only to 4- and 5-
year-olds, and not 3- and 6-year-olds.  We can only speculate as to the reasons for this 
unexpected pattern, but one possibility involves cross-cultural variations in the childcare that 
children of these ages receive.  In Brisbane, the large majority of children begin structured 
learning around age four when they enrol in preschool (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 
2017).  In the crèches where we tested the 3- to 5-year-old Bushman participants, however, 
attendance levels were typically low and limited educational and staffing resources were 
available (see Method and Supplementary Material).  Given that the quality of preschool 
classroom practices has been found to modulate children’s early cognitive development 
(Duncan, 2003; Peisner-Feinberg et al., 2001), one might infer that the 4- and 5-year-old 
Brisbane children received a performance boost due to their increased education levels.  In 
other words, these children may have performed at a level beyond what would be expected 
during human cognitive maturation in the absence of modern, Westernised schooling and 
associated parenting practices.  The Bushman children, on the other hand, may not have 
received such a performance boost until they began attending public school aged six.  
Alternatively, public schooling may have provided these children with the requisite 
confidence and skills to interact with strange adults and demonstrate previously latent 
competence on novel tasks such as ours.  Note, however, that the Bushman children’s 
performance was improving with age even before they turned six, and so they likely would 
have approached ceiling around this age or just after even without the benefits of schooling.   
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Whatever the reasons for the difference, the data suggest that similar proportions of 
Brisbane and Bushman children show signs of competence on the forked tube task before 
either group has begun formal education at age three, and by the time they are six a large 
majority of children from both cultures are competent.  There was no significant evidence 
that the Indigenous Australian children – who also begin formal learning around age four in 
local preschools – performed any differently from the Brisbane children across the age 
groups tested, although given the relatively small sample size of the Indigenous group we 
caution against concluding there are indeed no population differences.  
 To summarise, although certain elements of WEIRD societies such as formal 
preschooling may modulate children’s performance on the forked tube task, the overall 
pattern of acquisition during early childhood may be relatively fixed. And like other 
capacities that appear to universally develop during this period (see, e.g., Kuhl, 2004; Nielsen 
& Tomaselli, 2010), the faculty to imagine and prepare for alternative future events may 
represent a critical adaptation that gives humans a decisive advantage over other animals.  
Indeed, this capacity may have been essential to the emergence of complex novel planning 
practices in our ancestors, such as hedging bets by preparing for multiple possible 
contingencies of various future events (Hoerl & McCormack, 2018; Redshaw, 2014), or 
mentally comparing and adjusting several possible courses of action before deciding on a 
final plan (Ambrose, 2010; Baumeister, Maranges, & Sjåstad, in press; Suddendorf & 
Corballis, 2007).  Initial results suggest that our extant great ape relatives may not be able to 
consistently pass the forked tube task or related tasks (Redshaw & Suddendorf, 2016; 
Suddendorf et al., 2017; Tecwyn, Thorpe, & Chappell, 2013), implying that the capacity may 
have evolved in a relatively recent common human ancestor after the split from the 
chimpanzee lineage.  Nonetheless, it is important to point out that here we only have data 
from children living in one WEIRD society and two non-WEIRD societies.  Replications 
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with children from other groups would increase our confidence that the capacity does indeed 
have a relatively fixed early childhood ontogeny. 
 Even if children do universally become able to prepare for alternative futures during 
early childhood, it does not necessarily follow that the capacity would inevitably develop 
during this period in the complete absence of cultural influences. Rather, as suggested in the 
introduction, it may be that exposure to certain factors apparently common to all cultures, 
such as future-oriented language markers (Bittner, 2005; Comrie, 1985; Malotki, 1983), is a 
necessary prerequisite for early childhood acquisition. One way to potentially shed light on 
this issue would be to administer the forked tube task to deaf children whose hearing parents 
are not fluent in sign language.  Indeed, these children are typically delayed in exposure to 
and acquisition of language tense (Grimshaw, Adelstein, Bryden, & MacKinnon, 1998; 
Meier, 1991). If early exposure to future-oriented language markers is in fact critical to 
development, then one might predict these children to perform relatively poorly on the forked 
tube task, just as they do on theory of mind tasks (see, e.g., Peterson & Siegal, 1995).  
On a related note, it must be acknowledged that here we have only traced the cross-
cultural development of one (albeit critical) component of foresight.  Indeed, as has been 
found in studies of theory of mind development (e.g., Shahaeian, Peterson, Slaughter, & 
Wellman, 2011; Wellman et al., 2006), there may still be robust cultural variations in the 
steps that children acquire diverse instantiations of the capacity.  To this end, future research 
may wish to investigate the cross-cultural development of other future-oriented behaviours, 
such as tool acquisition and subsequent use (see, e.g., Suddendorf, Nielsen, & von Gehlen, 
2011), acting for future desire states (see, e.g., Atance & Meltzoff, 2006), intertemporal 
choice (see, e.g., Bulley & Pepper, 2017; Metcalf & Atance, 2011; Mischel, Shoda, & 
Rodriguez, 1989), deliberate practice (see Brinums, Imuta, & Suddendorf, in press), external 
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reminder setting (see Redshaw, Vandersee, Bulley, & Gilbert, in press), and affective 
forecasting (see Gautam, Bulley, von Hippel, & Suddendorf, 2017).   
 An interesting secondary finding from our study was the absence of any evidence for 
sex differences in children’s performance.  While it is always difficult to draw conclusions 
from null results, the fact that we failed to detect an effect in our reasonably large sample is 
consistent with the view that there are minimal differences, if any, between young boys’ and 
girls’ basic capacity to imagine and prepare for alternative future possibilities.  If so, then the 
capacity may represent a part of normal cognitive maturation that is not only relatively 
independent of cultural background, but also relatively independent of biological sex.  This 
does not necessarily mean that boys and girls (or men and women) will deploy the capacity 
equally effectively in all domains, but it may suggest that the fundamental mechanisms 
underlying the ability emerge around the same age in both sexes. 
In conclusion, we have provided initial evidence to suggest that boys and girls from 
both WEIRD and non-WEIRD societies typically become able to imagine and prepare for 
alternative future possibilities during the early childhood years.  This early ontogeny is 
therefore not contingent on cultural factors specific to WEIRD societies, and may even 
indicate a universally human acquisition period. 
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Table 1. Participant demographics across the three cultural groups tested. 
Participant group Brisbane Indigenous Australian South African Bushman 
3-year-olds (m, f) 16 (8, 8) 8 (6, 2) 25 (16, 9) 
4-year-olds (m, f) 16 (8, 8) 16 (9, 7) 22 (10, 12) 
5-year-olds (m, f) 16 (8, 8) 9 (5, 4) 24 (13, 11) 
6-year-olds (m, f) 16 (8, 8) - 25 (9, 16) 
Total (m, f) 64 (32, 32) 33 (20, 13) 96 (48, 48) 
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Table 2. Summary of post-hoc GEE analyses of age-based cross-cultural performance 
differences 
Age group 
QIC value for 
null model 
QIC value for 
cultural difference Conclusion 
3-year-olds 336.73 341.57 No evidence for cultural difference     (χ2(1) = .63, p = .426)a 
4-year-olds 297.99 279.13 Brisbane > Bushman                            (χ2(1) = 7.34, p = .007) 
5-year-olds 314.20 276.75 Brisbane > Bushman                            (χ2(1) = 9.22, p = .002) 
6-year-olds 200.65 205.55 No evidence for cultural difference     (χ2(1) = .40, p = .527)a 
Note. Models were selected on the basis of lowest QIC value (see Pan, 2001). Sex and Trial effects were not 
considered in these analyses, as there was no suggestion that these effects varied across cultures. 
a These null results come from the models including the Culture effect, which were not selected as the final 
models for 3- and 6-year-olds. 
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(a)   (b)   (c)   
 
Figure 1. Representative testing settings across the three cultural groups, showing the task 
from different angles. All (a) Brisbane children were tested inside a local museum, whereas 
(b) Indigenous Australian children were tested either inside or just outside daycare crèches or 
preschool classrooms, and (c) Bushman children were tested either inside or just outside day 
care crèches or public school classrooms. The large container varied across groups due to 
differing availability of materials. All three example children are demonstrating the correct 
response of covering two exits.  
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Figure 2. Percentage of children (across cultures and age groups) who covered two exits on 
the forked tube task over all six trials. 
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Figure 3. Cumulative percentages of children’s response patterns across ages and cultural 
groups. Blue bars indicate children who covered two exits on every trial. Green bars indicate 
children who failed the first trial, but eventually covered two exits and sustained that 
response across all subsequent trials. Yellow bars indicate children who covered two exits at 
least once but regressed to covering a single exit on at least one subsequent trial. Red bars 
indicate children who failed all trials. 
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